Could Aurora Cannabis Fall Below $1 in 2020?

In just a matter of days, we’ll be closing the curtain on 2019, which turned out to be an incredibly good year for the broad-based markets, and an abysmal year for marijuana stock investors.

Everything began well, with cannabis stocks leading the charge throughout the first quarter. But the wheels, and everything else that wasn’t welded on, soon fell off the wagon. Persistent supply issues throughout Canada, high tax rates in a number of recreationally legal U.S. states, and…

a resilient black market have made investing in pot stocks particularly painful in 2019.

For example, the most popular stock on online investing platform Robinhood, Aurora Cannabis (NYSE:ACB), has shed 80% of its value since peaking in mid-March. And note, I don’t mean most popular pot stock — I mean the most-held stockperiod, on the entire platform. At just $2 a share, the company probably looks like a bargain to the nearly 10% of Robinhood members who currently own it.

But looks can be deceiving, and while it might sound far-fetched, Aurora Cannabis’ stock could fall another 50% in 2020 and potentially dip below $1 a share.

Everything looked perfect for Aurora Cannabis…

On paper, at least, Aurora Cannabis looks like it has its ducks in a row. No grower has more peak production capacity, with 15 cultivation facilities capable of probably close to 700,000 kilos per year. These large growing campuses are also capable of yielding more per square foot than the industry average, which, when coupled with its size, would be expected to push per-gram production costs well below the industry average.

Aurora also has a clear lead when it comes to international expansion efforts. Including Canada, it has a presence — be it in cultivation, research, export, or a partnership — in 25 countries. Only two of its peers are even at or above one dozen countries. The thinking had been that if and when Canadian dried cannabis flower became oversupplied, Aurora would simply lean on these foreign sales channels, where higher-margin medical marijuana is legal, to offload its excess supply.

This is also a company that brought in famed billionaire activist investor Nelson Peltz as a strategic adviser in mid-March. It was no secret that Aurora was looking for an equity investment and/or brand-name partnership with a company in the food or beverages industry to help with the forthcoming launch of derivatives (i.e., edibles, infused beverages, vapes, topicals, tinctures, and concentrates). Peltz’s background as an activist investor happens to focus on the food and beverage industry, making him the perfect person to bridge an eventual partnership or equity investment.

But estimates and projections don’t always lead to concrete results, as we’ve witnessed with Aurora Cannabis.

…Then it all fell apart

As you’re likely well aware, one of the main issues that’s hurt all Canadian growers is the inability to get product in front of consumers. The government agency Health Canada is partly to blame for delaying the rollout of high-margin derivatives by two months, as well as contending with an enormous backlog of licensing applications, thereby leading to long wait times to plant and sell cannabis. But a lot of the finger-pointing is directed at Ontario, which had a meager 24 dispensaries open on the one-year anniversary of the legalization of recreational weed sales. A change in Ontario’s dispensary licensing policy should help, but there’s no immediate relief for the most-populous province’s supply concerns.

The problem is that there are also company-specific issues beyond just getting its products in front of the consumer. For example, Aurora Cannabis’ aggressive expansion tactics, which included more than a dozen acquisitions over the course of three years, are hurting shareholders two ways.

First, the company financed practically all of its deals, as well as its ongoing operations, by issuing common stock or, in rarer instances, convertible debentures. By using its stock as capital, Aurora has ballooned its outstanding share count from 16 million to close to 1.1 billion in a little over five years. No matter what sort of assets are added, it’s virtually impossible for shareholders to contend with this level of dilution without being hammered.

Second, Aurora’s aggressive acquisition strategy looks to have led to…

Continue reading at THE MOTLEY FOOL

You May Also Like

About the Author: admin

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *